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Proceedings of the Annual Acquisition Research Program 
The following article is taken as an excerpt from the proceedings of the annual 
Acquisition Research Program.  This annual event showcases the research projects 
funded through the Acquisition Research Program at the Graduate School of Business 
and Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School.  Featuring keynote speakers, 
plenary panels, multiple panel sessions, a student research poster show and social 
events, the Annual Acquisition Research Symposium offers a candid environment 
where high-ranking Department of Defense (DoD) officials, industry officials, 
accomplished faculty and military students are encouraged to collaborate on finding 
applicable solutions to the challenges facing acquisition policies and processes within 
the DoD today.  By jointly and publicly questioning the norms of industry and academia, 
the resulting research benefits from myriad perspectives and collaborations which can 
identify better solutions and practices in acquisition, contract, financial, logistics and 
program management. 
For further information regarding the Acquisition Research Program, electronic 
copies of additional research, or to learn more about becoming a sponsor, please visit 
our program website at: 
www.acquistionresearch.org  
For further information on or to register for the next Acquisition Research 
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Using a 3-tier framework for a study of the acquisition of an Advance Military Vehicle 
(AMV), we explore the shaping of the buyer-supplier relationship in the context of the UK 
defence acquisition process. This relationship encompasses the Ministry of Defence (MoD), a 
monopsonist, partnering with a monopolistic defence industry. The transition from an 
oligopolistic to monopolistic defence industry is a result of a number of government policies that 
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have created a consolidated defence industrial base. Defence industry relationships have 
historically been adversarial, making defence acquisition in the past inefficient. We identify 
Integrated Project Teams (IPTs) as being central to the institutional level aims of creating a 
collaborative industrial relation. IPTs characterise relational contracting practices at the 
governance level, which demands communication, collaboration and trust. However, difficulties 
at the process level in utilising relational contracting because of a lack of definition, 
communication and mutual gain within the day-to-day business of the IPT limit the benefits of 
this approach. This failure to create an effective partnership between the MoD and its prime 
contractors highlights the major challenge facing the UK defence sector in its transition towards 
capability acquisition, such as Network Enabled Capability (NEC). NEC demands a more 
collaborative, through-life approach to defence acquisition. 
Introduction 
Defence acquisition has undergone profound changes in recent years as the 
consolidation of the supply sector, the shift towards the acquisition of capability rather than 
platforms and the development of systems-of-systems technologies have generated major 
challenges for both demand and the supply sides. Through a case study of an Advanced 
Military Vehicle (AMV) and the Integrated Project Team (IPT) that is delivering it, we propose in 
this paper to explore these issues using a three-tier model that captures how institutional 
policies are experienced within the project team and how, in turn, those experiences shape 
institutional policies. Our conceptual framework for this analysis are drawn from Gidden’s (1984) 
work on structuration and Williamson’s (1975,1985) work on transaction cost economics (TCE) 
as a model of understanding managers’ behaviour in an economic environment characterised 
by a complex and shifting mix of market and hierarchy in relationships between organisations. 
The model framework aims to provide an analysis of the institutional, governance and process 
levels of a transaction. 
At the institutional level, we aim to understand the current acquisition policy of the buyer, 
the MoD, and how this impacts its suppliers in the defence industrial base. An historical review 
of defence industrial relations is therefore presented. It is shown that the MoD is shifting its 
acquisition policy from being platform-centric to capability-centric; coinciding with this 
modernisation programme is a gradual change in the structure of the defence sector. In the 
governance level section, we use a transaction cost approach to examine the choice of 
relational contracting, demonstrating how the IPT structure and ethos favours relational 
contracting practices. The discussions will emphasise the bidding process, contract award 
stage, and the demonstration phase, and the impact each has on the long-term relationship 
between the MoD and its prime contractor. The final level of the three-tier model is the process 
level. In the process level section, we consider the organisational structure of the IPT. We look 
closely at how the IPT works as a team, how they deliver the tasks for each phase in the context 
of the routines on the project. In our discussions, we emphasise the importance of cross-level 
interaction. We begin the paper by explaining our conceptual framework and method.    
Conceptual Framework 
Our conceptual framework for investigating the processes of the acquisition of military 
vehicles is derived from the general sociological work of Giddens (1984) on “structuration,” 
which has been more recently developed as the “tectonic approach” to organisation (Winch 
1994). Applying the tectonic approach to the management of projects identifies three levels of 
analysis that interact with each other in a recursive cycle of constraint and change (as illustrated 
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in Figure 1). In the tectonic approach, the institutional level of analysis shapes and is shaped by 
decisions made at the governance level. Decisions at the governance level select the 
organisational structures within which the project process flows, but those processes also shape 
governance-level decisions. The process level is where the project is implemented through a 
flow of information, which initiates and controls a flow of materials.  
The institutional level covers the wide range of issues around the features of the national 
and sectoral business systems, but in the defence sector, the principal institutional 
manifestation is the current defence ministry acquisition policy, and so it is this institutional 

























shaping of structure structuring of action
 
Figure 1. The Tectonic Model 
(Winch, 2009) 
The conceptual framework for the analysis of the governance level is derived from 
institutional economics, particularly the work of Williamson (1975, 1985) on transaction cost 
economics, as adapted for project organisations by Winch (2001). Williamson’s basic 
proposition is that total costs of supply are derived from two main components—production 
costs and transaction costs. Production costs are well understood and, in essence, involve the 
efficient transformation of inputs into outputs, where prices are used to signal the most efficient 
choice of technology. Transaction costs are the costs of co-ordinating any complex production 
process and occur when a good or service crosses a “technologically separable interface.” He 
argues that there are two basic options for co-ordinating—or governing—transactions. A market 
transaction is where independent buyers and sellers meet in the market to negotiate a price for 
the supply of a good or service in a spot contract—prices are set by what Adam Smith called the 
“invisible hand” of the market. An hierarchical transaction is on in which the transaction is 
governed internally by administrative means—prices are determined by what Alfred Chandler 
called the “visible hand” of management through an authority relation. Between these two polar 
forms of transaction governance lay a wide variety of mixed forms of relational contracts. 
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What determines the most efficient governance mode on a project? Williamson argued 
that there were three main characteristics of transactions that influenced the choice of how they 
are governed: uncertainty, frequency and asset specificity. Uncertainty affects transactions 
because it creates bounded rationality for decision-makers. This bounded rationality makes 
writing a complete and unambiguous contract between the parties impossible because of 
uncertainty regarding the precise conditions under which the contract will be executed and also 
makes it impossible to measure fully the performance of the contract. Asset specificity is the 
condition in which either the buyer or supplier is limited in its choice of transaction partner due to 
the specific nature of the resources to be supplied. This asset specificity may be pre-contract (in 
which case, the problem is one of monopoly or monopsony in the market), or it may be 
generated post-contract because contract-specific investments are made by one or both of the 
parties in the hold-up problem (Masten, Meehan & Snyder, 1991). This generates the possibility 
of opportunism on the part of one of the parties as they exploit the other’s disadvantage—which 
often takes the form of withholding information from the other party. Frequency affects 
transaction governance because one-off transactions provide no opportunity to learn about the 
other party, while repeated transactions allow learning about the behaviour of the other party 
and hence the generation of trust. Thus, the most appropriate choice of transaction governance 
mode can be thought of as occupying a three-dimensional space in the manner indicated in the 
middle level of Figure 1. 
Governance has two distinct aspects: 
 The contractual, which captures the underlying legal basis of the relationship. While 
the precise formulation of these legal relationships varies significantly between 
countries, there is a large degree of functional equivalence in all developed 
economies between these formulations. 
 The relational, which captures the interpersonal and interorganisational aspects 
(processes and behaviours) of the governance arrangements around issues such as 
trust and perceived equity in governance. 
Within this perspective, the extremes of the governance continuum can be considered to 
be tending to zero on relationship aspects at the market end (pure spot contracting) and tending 
to zero on the contractual aspects at the hierarchy end (pure autocracy). Although some have 
argued that the contractual aspects can undermine the development of the relationship aspects, 
recent research has shown that they are more complementary than antagonistic dimensions of 
transaction governance (Poppo & Zenger, 2002). 
The process level in Figure 1 is shaped by the institutional and governance levels and in 
turn shapes those levels, which shows how, for a given project mission, riding the project 
lifecycle is a dynamic interplay between routines, tasks, and teams (Manning, 2008): 
 Routines are the learned practices developed within the industry recipe that are 
carried from project to project and then adapted to meet the needs of particular 
projects (Feldman & Pentland, 2003; Nelson & Winter, 1982). Routines therefore 
specify the how of riding the project lifecycle; they are an essential element of 
managerial activity, yet their implementation is contradictory in that they both 
constrain and enable managerial action. 
 Teams are the human resources allocated from the resource bases mobilised on 
particular projects, providing the who of riding the project lifecycle.  
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 Tasks are the what of riding the project lifecycle—the set of tasks that has to be 
completed in order to realise the particular project mission, typically captured in the 
work breakdown structure. 
Routines, tasks and teams are negotiated and renegotiated for a particular project 
chartered by its project mission. As the project moves through the lifecycle, the tasks change, 
and hence different teams that deploy different routines are mobilised. However, prior choices of 
routines also shape which teams are selected by which criteria and which tasks are deemed to 
be in scope to the project. The coordination routines used by project managers to organise  task 
execution teams need to be continually adapted to the needs of the particular project, while 
retaining enough overt good practice to serve as a legitimation for the actions of the project 
manager. Thus, the project process is indeed a negotiated order in which “the bases of 
concerted action (social order) must be reconstituted continually; or [...] worked at” (Strauss, 
Schatzman, Ehrlich, Bucher & Shabshin, 1971, p. 104), and routines provide the raw material 
for this work in the context of governance and institutions. 
Method 
Our research method to explore the dynamics of defence acquisition is a case of the 
acquisition of an Advanced Military Vehicle (AMV) by the UK’s Ministry of Defence (MoD). Our 
data on the institutional level come largely from a review of MoD policy documents 
complemented by a number of strategic-level interviews with key informants. Our data on the 
governance and process levels come from a case study of the AMV project organisation, which 
is delivering it for MoD, and consists of 19 field interviews with project participants and the 
collection of documentary data. The informants interviewed for this research are identified in 
Figure 3. This field research is still in progress, so the data reported here represent only a 
preliminary statement of our findings. The AMV is presently at the demonstration phase of the 
CADMID process presented in Figure 2. 
The Institutional Level 
The institutional level is represented by an evolving defence sector, characteristically 
dependent on national defence policy from successive governments. The UK defence sector is 
reliant on the buying behaviour of its largest single buyer (a monopsonist), the MoD. It is the 
MoD’s buying power that enables it to “determine the size, structure, conduct and performance 
of defence industries” (Hartley, 1991, p. 79). To understand the complexity of the UK defence 
acquisition process, it is important to comprehend the specific nature of the defence industry, 
the defence business system (the defence industrial base), and the economic policies that have 
shaped the defence sector. This narrative will develop the institutional level analysis by charting 
evolutions: from privatisation to prime contracting, from a competitive industrial sector to a 
consolidated, monopolistic one, and from protectionism to liberalisation.  
We begin our analysis of the defence sector at a critical point in UK defence history—the 
era of privatisation heralded by the Conservative Government of Margaret Thatcher. Of the five 
largest defence companies in 1979, four were state owned: British Aerospace, British 
Shipbuilders, Royal Ordnance Factories and Rolls Royce. The exception was General Electric 
Company (GEC) (Smith, 1990). The government favoured a free market policy in which the 
MoD could engage in competitive tendering. The newly privatised firms and new entrants in the 
defence sector would bid for defence contracts, and the invisible hand of the market would 
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 Newly privatised firms were the recipient of vital technical and managerial 
knowledge, making the playing field unbalanced for new entrants; 
 Protectionist policy that favoured domestic defence companies meant there was 
minimal competition from foreign-owned companies. 
The lack of competition on the supply-side meant that the existence of monopolies was 
common in the defence sector, post-privatisation. The bargaining positions of the monopsonist 
buyer and monopolistic supplier were levelled by the buyer having regulatory powers and the 
supplier possessing monopoly powers. Furthermore, defence contracts predominantly 
incorporated cost-plus payment terms under which the MoD retained significant levels of 
project risk (Cullen & Hickman, 2001). Because of the complexity and uncertainty evident in 
defence projects, it is difficult to assess the efficiency of a cost-plus contract. A key part of cost-
plus contracts is the cost-reimbursable aspect of the agreement, making costly investments 
attractive to contractors (Williamson, 1967) and it was, therefore, a common feature of defence 
acquisition projects.  
The early days of privatisation were fraught with conflict between the MoD and the 
defence industry. “By the early 1980s there was considerable dissatisfaction with such 
traditional procurement policies. Lack of competition had, it was argued, created inefficiency in 
the defence sector, while cost-plus contracts created little incentives to keep costs down” 
(Bishop, 1995, p. 175). The MoD recognised that it had to change the nature of its role in the 
defence sector from its traditional monitoring and auditing function to a more stringent 
administrator role. It also acknowledged a desire to transfer the risk of defence projects to 
suppliers (Smith, 1990). Peter Levene, the MoD Chief of Defence Procurement (1984-91), was 
responsible for the implementation of the MoD’s new policy of “competition and collaboration.” 
The procurement reforms, more commonly known as the Levene reforms, targeted the 
“promotion of competition and the transfer of risk from the MoD to industry” (Macdonald, 1999, 
p. 6). The MoD was able to transfer the risk in procurement by replacing the cost-plus contracts 
with firm- or fixed-price contracts let by competitive tender. “Since 1983, MoD has become more 
conscious of the need to obtain better value for money in equipment procurement. As a result, it 
has become a more demanding customer, with competition as the central element in its more 
commercial approach” (Hartley, 1991, pp. 75-76).   
As the Cold War neared its end, in the late 80s, the UK defence budget was reduced 
from its peak in 1985 by a gradual decrease of 18% in real terms between 1986-87 and 1990-91 
(McIntosh, 1993). In addition, the MoD opened up defence contracts to foreign competition in a 
partial liberalisation of the defence sector: partial because the MoD continued to implement 
protectionist policies. The UK manufacturing sector was dependent, in supporting local 
economies and employment, on the defence sector; awarding defence contracts to foreign 
companies was politically sensitive. The Thatcher Government signed up to the Independent 
European Programme Group, which was geared towards opening up the European defence 
equipment market to greater international competition. Theoretically, overseas defence 
companies could compete for procurement contracts tendered by the MoD (Smith, 1990). 
However, it was evident that the MoD was not ready to pressure the domestic defence industry 
with competition from established foreign companies. In 1987-88, the only foreign-owned 
company belonging to the top 15 companies to receive a contract worth over £100 million was 
Boeing (Smith, 1990). The argument for the continuation of protectionist policies by the MoD 
was also due to the fear that key technological knowledge would be lost to foreign-owned 
companies. The prevailing view was this would damage the domestic defence sector and make 
the UK reliant on foreign technology. 
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Foreign-owned firms entered the UK defence sector in the more “acceptable” form of 
alliances, joint ventures and, mergers: safeguarding local jobs and preserving the domestic 
defence industries. The combination of competition, divestures and liberalisation brought about 
the restructuring of the UK defence industry. The larger defence companies moved to 
consolidate their positions by acquiring smaller firms. 
1988-89 saw major changes in structure and corporate strategy in the European 
Defence Industries. The GEC-Siemens bid for Plessey, the Daimler-Chrysler acquisition 
of [Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm], the merging of Aerospatiale’s avionics interests into 
Thomson CSF, were among the most notable of a range of acquisition and divestments, 
national and international, which have tended to increase concentration. (Smith, 1990, p. 
200)  
The restructuring of the UK defence sector transformed the defence industrial base from 
oligopolies to monopolies. Contrary to its own objectives of creating competition, the MoD was 
partly responsible for the creation of “industry champions.” When GEC moved to acquire 
Ferranti and VSEL, the Monopolies and Mergers Commission recommended against the 
acquisition. The MoD, however, intervened to encourage the acquisition in an overall aim to 
protect defence industrial capabilities, to ensure domestic demands were met, and support 
defence contractors to compete in the international defence exports market (Macdonald, 1999). 
Ironically, in 1999, GEC’s board decided to divest its defence business (Alenia Marconi 
Systems) to British Aerospace, which created the UK’s largest defence company, BAE 
Systems.  
During the 1990s, competitive tendering was more evident in defence contracting. This, 
however, was counteracted by the increase in monopoly defence industries, which to a large 
extent was counter intuitively supported by the MoD. The MoD, in effect, created a defence 
sector with few players controlling their own specialist component industries. UK defence 
companies began expanding their activities internationally, e.g., BAE Systems North America, 
and reducing their reliance on their domestic market. The UK defence procurement supply-
chain relationship in the late 90s was characterised by “global market conditions (concentration) 
and increased customer (MoD) sophistication to change” (Humphries & Wilding, 2004, p. 261). 
The restructuring of the defence sector combined with the introduction of firm and fixed price 
contracts had major effects on the once cosy relationship between the defence industry and 
ministry. The MoD moved to control the monopolistic supplier by introducing greater competition 
in the tendering process and by creating strict conditions on non-competitive contracts with 
monopoly suppliers. The “No Acceptable Price, No Contract” initiative was implemented in 1992 
in non-competitive defence contracts. This initiative was introduced to ensure that contractors 
would abide by the “value for money” principles. Target Cost Incentive agreements were 
predominantly used for non-competitive defence contracts. The contracts stipulated that the 
MoD and its contractor would share the risk of cost-overruns or the savings accrued 
(Macdonald, 1999). In placing these stringent controls on their suppliers in terms of costs and 
performance, the MoD was entering into a more adversarial relationship with the defence 
industry. “There was also a decline in mutual co-operation as civil servants adopted more 
hostile attitudes during contract negotiations in order to secure the lowest prices possible” 
(Macdonald, 1999, p. 18).  
Prime contracting was introduced as the mechanism for transferring risk from the 
customer (MoD) to the supplier. In the past, the MoD was responsible for integrating the 
separate components and systems of the platform (end product). The responsibility of systems 
integration was passed onto the main supplier (prime contractor) in the supply chain, and the 
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prime contractor was responsible for overall supply chain management. In security-sensitive 
areas, the MoD maintained control over the selection of subcontractors. The prime contractor 
was given project milestones, such as technical demonstrations or systems delivery, linked to 
payment terms in either firm- or fixed-price contracts (Mathews & Parker, 1999). The allocation 
of a prime contractor to a defence project can be a complex issue.  
The challenge of allocating a prime contractor rather than retaining systems production 
in-house (make-or-buy decision) is explainable using a transaction cost approach. The aim of 
prime contracting is to minimise the project risk. The risk is not always easy to identify, or cost, 
due to the complexities and uncertainties in defence contracting. The MoD is affected by 
information impactedeness problems (Williamson, 1975), as a result of the 
uncertainty/complexity being combined with bounded rationality. “MoD does not routinely obtain 
data on which to base an assessment of comparative costs” (Mathews & Parker, 1999, p. 36) 
making it difficult to choose the most cost-effective prime contractor. For the suppliers prime 
contracting was, at the beginning, a risky venture in terms of the costs or profits that could be 
recouped. Prime contractors responded by adding premiums for risk acceptance. When 
performance and budget milestones were achieved, the prime contractors gained premium 
payments on top of their profits. If the risk of overspending was not mitigated, then the 
contractor was damaged by the costs/penalties: thus the gamble. These uncertainties and 
complexities have, over time, become manageable: “Arguably, the UK defence industry is now 
more capable of developing weapon systems, rather than individual subsystems, than was 
previously the case” (Mathews & Parker, 1999, p. 37), through the advantages of what Winch 
(2001) terms the learning effects on transaction costs.  
The introduction of prime contracting was part of the MoD’s strategy to position itself as 
an “intelligent buyer” in the defence industry. This was achieved through the transfer of project 
risk to the suppliers, the introduction of more stringent contractual agreements—such as firm, 
fixed-price and incentive-based contracts—and competitive tendering as well as non-
competitive controls. The MoD, on the other hand, needed to address the adversarial nature of 
its relationship with industry. The introduction of the Strategic Defence Review (MoD, 1998) 
commenced the process of addressing the challenges in these relationships. It highlighted three 
areas in which defence procurement was failing to achieve efficiency (despite the changes 
mentioned above): poor value for money; poor project management; and poor industrial 
relationships. In order to tackle these issues, the MoD introduced the “Smart Procurement 
Initiative.” The initiative was a joint exercise with defence suppliers to identify a new set of 
procurement processes that would improve the way the MoD procured defence equipment. The 
changes were brought about with consultation from the Defence Industries Council and the 
Trade Associations.1 The MoD restructured its organisation as a result. In 1999, the three single 
service logistic organisations for the Royal Navy, Royal Air Force, and Army, were unified to 
create the Defence Logistics Organisation (DLO). In the same year, the Procurement Executive 
was given agency status, and became the Defence Procurement Agency (DPA). The 
responsibilities of the DLO and DPA are shown in the lifecycle process CADMID (Concept, 
Assessment, Disposal, Manufacture, In-Service and Disposal) in Figure 2. “The CADMID cycle 
has been used since 1999, when it was devised as part of the ‘Smart Procurement’ initiative to 
                                                
1 The Defence Industries Council is chaired by the Defence Secretary and constitutes representatives 
from the defence industries and the four major trade associations (the Society of British Aerospace 
Companies, Defence Manufacturers Association, Federation of the Electronics Industry and British Naval 
Equipment Association). The purpose of the council is for the MoD to consult the defence industries on 
matters of common interest (MoD, 1998). 
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deliver equipment capability within agreed performance, cost and time parameters” (MoD, 2006, 
p. 13). The DPA was given responsibility for the procurement phase of the lifecycle (Concept-to-













The reforms within the Smart Procurement Initiative were aimed not only at restructuring 
the MoD but also at looking to create a partnership with prime contractors in which competition 
would create better value for money and customer service. “This introduces a ‘whole-life 
approach’ to acquisition, and has as one of the main tenets, the use of MoD Integrated Projects 
Teams to work closely with all contractors and their suppliers in order to identify ‘Gainshare’ 
opportunities” (Cullen & Hickman, 2001, p. 525). Gainshare is the mechanism by which the MoD 
promotes cooperation with its prime contractor and incentivises them to identify possible 
savings which can then be inserted into the contract agreement. IPTs2 were created as an 
embodiment of the collaborative relationship between the MoD and its prime contractor. “The 
overriding objective of the IPTs is to reduce the costs of procurement by developing more open 
relationships with their contractors promoting innovation and monitoring all operations within a 
‘shared data environment’” (Cullen & Hickman, 2001, p. 527). 
The Smart Procurement Initiative, while having many advantages, was restricted in 
scope. The MoD recognised that in order to reform its supply-chain strategy it needed to look 
beyond procurement and encompass the entire acquisition process. The effective acquisition 
and support of defence capability incorporates initial procurement and on-going support as 
integral parts of the overall acquisition process. The Smart Procurement Initiative was renamed 
Smart Acquisition in 2000. The aim of Smart Acquisition is “to enhance defence capability by 
                                                
2 IPTs consist of MoD personnel from key specialisations (such as finance and defence requirements 
office) working alongside business unit representatives from the prime contractor to deliver defence 
acquisition from concept-to-disposal. 
Figure 2. CADMID  
(Adapted from NAO, 2004, p. 29) 
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acquiring and supporting equipment more effectively in terms of time, cost and performance” 
(MoD, 2001, p. 4). Smart Acquisition seeks to improve the relationship between the MoD and 
the defence sector based on seven principles:   
 A whole life approach, typified by applying through life costing techniques 
 Integrated Project Teams (IPTs) with clearly identified customers 
 A better, more open relationship with industry 
 More investment in the early phase of projects 
 Effective trade-offs between system performance, through-life costs and time  
 New procurement approaches, including incremental acquisition  
 A streamlined process for project approval  
With these principles, the MoD is making an implicit change in the way it wants to do 
business with its industrial base. The MoD wants to move away from the adversarial relationship 
which has typified defence equipment acquisition and create a partnership approach (MoD, 
2002). The issue of responsibility for project risks was an important driver of the changes made 
to the acquisition process. With Public Private Partnerships and Private Finance Initiatives, 
becoming more evident in defence equipment projects (MoD, 2002), risk management has 
become central to how projects are managed and delivered. The MoD is intent on placing the 
risk on the prime contractor; however, this means that it has to relinquish the propriety rights, 
which provide the returns on risk. This affords prime contractor the chance to exploit 
opportunities in the export market (depending on regulatory rules imposed on defence exports) 
using their proprietary knowledge and products. The MoD loses the technical know-how that 
comes with development and is thus more reliant on its industrial base, making the relationship 
it has with its suppliers ever more important. Smart Acquisition attempts to apply a range of 
principles to create an efficient and effective defence acquisition process. The MoD continues to 
restructure its organisation so that it can improve the acquisition process. The latest of these 
restructures was the merger of the DLO, DPA and the DCSA (Defence Communication Service 
Agency) in April 2007 to create Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S). The DE&S has 
assumed all responsibilities of the previous departments and agency—the main aim of the 
integration being to create a coherent organisation and remove dual accountability problems 
inherent in the past configuration (MoD, 2007).  
Central to the changing nature of defence industrial relationships is the formation of 
IPTs. The structure of the IPTs has slightly changed (with the restructuring of the MoD), but the 
vision remains the same as originally conceptualised. IPTs originally were dually accountable to 
the DPA and DLO, as shown in Figure 2. In the current DE&S structure, this dual accountability 
has been removed, however the day-to-day activities and the people working in IPTs remains 
the same as before (MoD, 2007).  
Although the main function of IPTs—the delivery of equipment and support to the Front 
Line—will remain fundamentally unchanged there will be differences to the ways in 
which they fulfil this role. In fulfilling these responsibilities, team leaders and their staff 
will, as now, be required to work within the overall DE&S governance framework and in 
accordance with its key processes. (MoD, 2007, p. 16)  
The vision remains to create better engagement between the MoD and its supplier(s) 
through the IPT mechanism. This is a policy vision, which has been espoused in numerous MoD 
policy papers and publications (MoD, 1998; 2002; 2005). For example, at the institutional level, 
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IPTs possess a policy context. On the governance level, they are identified in terms of the 
relational contracting approach they engender, and in investigating the day-to-day activities of 
IPT members, we can identify the “teams, tasks and routines,” which characterise the process 
level. This does not, however, suggest that the levels are inherently synergetic. As we shall 
discuss in the following sections, there are stark differences in the vision outlined at the 
institutional level, the purpose at the governance level, and the reality at the process level. 
A major development in UK defence acquisition in the last decade has been the 
transition towards “Capability Acquisition.” IPTs are responsible for delivering the capabilities 
required by the end-use customer, the Armed Forces. As early as 1998, the UK viewed its 
acquisition policy in terms of capabilities rather than platforms. In the Strategic Defence Review, 
the MoD (1998) states its desire to change its equipment acquisition from a “one for one basis” 
towards a more collective acquisition policy offering a “new level of battlefield capability.” “While 
the concept is still at a relatively early stage, we are now describing our Military Tasks in more 
generic terms using the language of effects. This supports a future force development process 
focussed on capability—able to contribute to delivering a range of effects—rather than like-for-
like platform replacement” (MoD, 2003, p. 10). The transition towards an acquisition policy 
based on capabilities has transformed the scope of defence acquisition towards a whole-life and 
integrated systems approach. Through-life capability management (TLCM) was introduced as a 
way of managing capability acquisition.  
There is a general shift in defence acquisition away from the traditional pattern of 
designing and manufacturing successive generations of platforms—leaps of capability 
with major new procurements or very significant upgrade packages—towards a new 
paradigm centred on support, sustainability and the incremental enhancement of existing 
capabilities from technology insertions. The emphasis will increasingly be on through-life 
capability management, developing open architecture that facilitates this and 
maintaining—and possibly enhancing—systems engineering competencies that 
underpin it. (MoD, 2005, p. 19)   
TLCM provides those in charge of delivering defence capability (IPTs and DE&S) with a 
holistic way of viewing current and future capability requirements, with incremental acquisition 
being a central part of the approach (MoD, 2006).  
TLCM will consider a much wider range of options for meeting capability needs, 
examining both new and in-service equipment solutions, exploring opportunities and 
implications for trading across all DLODs [Defence Lines of Development]—Equipment 
(including Support), Personnel, Training, Logistics, Infrastructure, Concepts—while 
considering capability delivery on a much longer term, programme basis. (MoD, 2007, p. 
7) 
“At the heart of the force structure and capabilities modernising programme is Network 
Enabled Capability (NEC)” (MoD, 2005, p. 20). The changes that are being planned at the 
operational level with Network Enabled Capability (NEC) has a direct effect on the overall 
strategic relationship between the MoD and industry. The MoD has identified, on the operational 
level, that it needs to use its information communication technology capability more effectively if 
it is going to meet the changing threats to national and international security. “NEC is crucial to 
the rapid delivery of military effect. The SDR New Chapter recognised NEC as being 
fundamental in counteracting terrorism abroad, with its ability to deliver precise and decisive 
military effects, with unparalleled speed and accuracy through linking sensors, decision-makers 
and weapon systems” (MoD, 2003, p. 11). Furthermore, NEC is the main focus of the response 
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to the changing nature of warfare: “Network Enabled Capability comprises three core elements: 
sensors (to gather information); a network (to fuse, communicate and exploit the information); 
and strike assets (to deliver military effects)” (James, 2004, p. 15). The aim is to use embedded 
ICT systems to create a network which will follow C4ISTAR (Command, Control, 
Communication and Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and 
Reconnaissance) capabilities.  
Thus, the current dynamic in the UK defence sector is shaped by three different (and not 
always complementary) factors: 
 Arrangements to cope with the effective bilateral monopoly in the markets for 
individual platform types by moving from competition to collaboration; 
 Changes inherent in the transition to acquiring capability rather than platforms via 
long-term contracts 
 Adapting to the opportunities offered by NEC integration across platforms to create 
systems of systems. 
The MoD’s response to these challenges is that: 
the nature of acquisition is evolving and we face an increasingly demanding and 
complex environment. Closer collaborative engagement between us and our industrial 
suppliers will be vital if we are to continue to deliver the improvements that the Armed 
Forces and UK taxpayers demand. (MoD, 2005, p. 131)  
Our preliminary research aims to identify how these institutional dynamics shape actions 
on the governance and process level, and consequently how actions at the process level shape 
the structure of governance, and in turn, the institutional level.  
The Governance Level 
The acquisition policies at the commencement of the project shaped significantly the 
governance arrangements. The feasibility stage in the mid-1990s involved 5 consortia; they are 
now all part of a single company. Of these proposals, 2 were taken forward and competing full 
proposals were submitted in 2001; the contract was awarded to the successful bidder in 2002. 
By 2004, these two former competitors had merged. This restructuring of the UK defence sector 
is experienced from the point of view of the governance level as a significant escalation of pre-
contract asset specificities thereby increasing the risks of opportunism. As we shall see, the 
growing risk of opportunism is being mitigated by a shift towards more collaborative transaction 
governance arrangements. This is one example of the way in which acquisition policies at the 
institutional level that are based on competitive tendering—in principle, in the absence of pre-
contract asset specificities—are being reshaped by changes at the governance level as the 
sector consolidates.  
Economic theory would predict vertical integration in such a situation—see the classic 
Fisher Body/General Motors case (e.g., Klein, 1996)—but this is rendered nugatory by the low 
transaction frequency. The MoD will only purchase around 65 vehicles from a one-off design in 
a single contract. The MoD has, therefore, been trying to develop more collaborative 
relationships with its suppliers, which are institutionalised in the concept of the Integrated 
Project Team (IPT) which from the perspective of the governance level can be conceived as a 
governance mechanism.  
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In addition to rising pre-contract asset specificity due to reduced competition at the 
governance level, uncertainty is increasing because of the shift from the procurement of 
platforms to the acquisition of “capability.” Unlike the platform it replaces, the contract for the 
AMV has an expected life of 37 years. From the in-service date, the Contractor Logistic Support 
contract will run for 5 years before it is renegotiated for the subsequent period. Considerable 
uncertainties surround the operational environment for the AMV over that period. The 
renegotiation process 5 years hence will also involve high levels of asset specificity as neither 
party has a viable alternative customer or supplier. This combination of uncertainty and asset 
specificity is likely to make negotiations difficult in the absence of high trust. 
Thus, one informant argued that  
[T]he evolution will be more towards a partnering relationship. If we [company] get it right 
we get to the point where there is no competition, we are automatically seen as the 
preferred source [...] against this backdrop of technology insertion, relieving equipment 
as opposed to replacing equipment we have to place ourselves in the position where we 
do become the customers best friend [...] Ultimately [this company] are going to have to 
go to TLCM. 
In order to set out the more collaborative aspirations of the IPT from the outset, one 
informant told us that  
The thing we did very early on when we signed the contract, is we got a joined IPT 
industry-MOD, we have a joint charter with a joint set of values [...] and the statement 
that we use collectively and the Project Manager from MOD coined at the time is we are 
wedded together in this, we all stand or fall together in success, if this doesn’t work there 
are no winners. And that has been the whole mentality behind it. So everybody is striving 
to make it work. 
This charter is presented in Panel 1. 
We will 
• Develop and maintain a team focused on delivering its commitments 
• Be professional in every aspect of the project 
• Recognise and celebrate success and progress at all levels of the team 
• Develop, maintain and enhance communication 
• Promote co-operation and joint problem solving 
• Develop trust and openness at all levels of the team to build strong and honest relationships, 
eliminating secrecy and defensive attitudes 
• Share knowledge throughout the project, enabling the provision of accurate information at all 
times 
Panel 1. The AMV IPT Project Charter 
(IPT documentation) 
This approach has yielded many positive results. We were told, for instance, that  
[T]his present MoD IPT in [programme name] is probably the best I have worked with in terms 
of friendliness, appreciative of our problems, sympathetic and working with us. There is a good 
work ethic in terms of wishing to work with us and help us help them. and It is very much, let’s 
take the customer along with us, let’s have the customer involved, so when we get to the 
milestone it is almost a rubber stamping exercise. 
 =
=
==================aÉÑÉåëÉ=^Åèìáëáíáçå=áå=qê~åëáíáçå======== - 323 - 
=
=
However, this collaborative approach also encountered a number of difficulties. One 
important idea behind the IPT was to have a co-located project team that could take advantage of 
team working, good communication and cooperation. This notion was to be realized through 
continuous interaction enabled by prescribed tasks, teams and routines. The management of 
relationships (customer, user, suppliers) was therefore a key tactic in this programme. However, 
the original bid was won through competitive tendering, and the dynamics inherent in such a 
process have placed significant constraints upon the IPT’s ability to collaborate because of the 
constraints of a project won by competition, with “a very tight contract, budget and margins 
squeezed to win the work.” For example, the proposed shared data environment (SDE), which 
would enable improved communication and coordination between industry and customer, was 
not effectively implemented due to cost and commercial constraints. 
The customer3 expectations have their foundation on the key performance requirement 
specified by the customer as well as industry’s offer—what was in the bid proposal. A challenge 
for the IPT is closing the gap between what was originally offered (the bid proposal) and the 
technical requirements specifications (TRS). Thus it was argued that  
I think there is a need to change in relation to the relationship with the customer. I know 
industry is in business, it wants to win the contract, it wants to make profits. But 
sometimes I think defence industry will tell the MOD what it wants to hear rather than 
what it is actually capable. You know they will promise everything and then there will be 
delays to the programme, because they can’t actually quite meet it.   
And that, 
There were also occasions where [industry] didn’t challenge the customer and say, do 
you really want this, is there a compromise here, explaining that what was being asked 
for as a requirement was unrealistic or unachievable or meant compromising something 
else. Sometimes to their detriment the team sat down and busted a gut to try and deliver 
what they promised and sometimes that was to their detriment; instead of turning around 
and saying look we are putting a lot of effort into this and actually it is unrealistic and 
unachievable. 
Thus, at the governance level, there is an understanding of the need to move towards a 
more collaborative approach as advocated by the IPT governance structure. However, this is 
constrained by the lingering effects of the competitive bidding process by which the supplier for the 
AMV was selected. This led to a highly resource-constrained environment, which meant that the 
appropriate investments in collaboration such as the SDE could not be fully implemented. 
The Process Level 
The IPT has around 120 members in all. The proposed structure, new to the prime 
contractor, was a direct response to the need of moving from platform to capability delivery. The 
IPT was structured around seven “ilities” or sub-system teams (e.g., reliability, mobility, 
software, C3I, fightability, survivability, Special To Role as highlighted in Figure 3) with a 
number of specialist functions in support (e.g., finance, contracts, programme, quality, supply 
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chain and business development). Each “ility” is led by a Cost Account Manager (CAM) who is 
responsible for delivering the tasks associated with achieving each sub-system functionality and 
for ensuring they are “harmonised” when integrated into the larger project. This involves both 
project management responsibilities such as scheduling and budgeting, project controls and 
also systems engineering responsibilities. The CAMs report through the Chief Engineer, who is 
accountable for specifications and requirements, and supported by an integration team. In a 
classic project matrix, the Programme Manager supported by his own team is accountable for 
delivery against project objectives. This is illustrated in Figure 3. Commercial functions report 
outside of both of these. Thus the IPT consists of three main types of team responsible for three 
different types of tasks—engineering design focused on technical creativity; programme 
management, focused on team co-ordination; and commercial, focused on external supplier 
selection and management.  
 
Figure 3. IPT Structure as of End of 2007 
(IPT documentation) 
The key player in this structure is the CAM, liaising with the Chief Engineer on 
engineering issues and the Programme Manager on project issues. This is perceived to be 
putting considerable strain on the CAMs, while there is also a perceived lack of system-level 
systems engineering to address cross-ility issues and a need for a “stronger systems 
engineering team.” This perception is a result of two things: first, the new structure to deliver 
capability means that system level responsibility and accountability lied within each “ility” rather 
than with a programme level systems engineering team, as had traditionally been the case on 
other programmes. The challenge was for the IPT to accept, understand and realise this new 
philosophy. Second, the constraints of the budget and schedule mean that the project was 
under-resourced. This resulted in not enough systems engineering being carried out at the front 
end of the project, which eventually had an impact on design development, and in CAMs being 
overloaded with systems engineering and project management type work. 
However, we were informed of a further issue:  
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[T]he danger there is because there are different ilities, each of them then develops a 
way of working that is slightly different from the next ility, and so you carry through with 
it, it gets more entrenched. And at some point in the programme you are going to say to 
the ilities people, I’m sorry but you are going to have to align your processes now. And 
that gets painful. Yeah, this happened. It was all a jumping, because there was always 
going to be a winner and losers. There is always going to be one process in preference 
of another. And it is still going on now as we go forward. The issue was not identified 
until now. The business processes are outside the [name of the programme] team. This 
should be generated from the business. The business should be saying to us this is how 
you budget, supply and set up relationships, that is how you construct X, this is how you 
can manage the requirement. That wasn’t there, so we had to generate all that 
ourselves. And all this was unplanned work. 
The dynamics of task and team are structured around a number of best practice routines 
at both the corporate and IPT levels, yet these are perceived to be inadequate. Those at the IPT 
level are mandated by the MoD; while those at the company level are mandated by the 
corporate level. These routines are perceived to constrain the dynamics of tasks and teams but 
also provide formalised processes that offer assurance for the customer and corporate levels. 
Generally acknowledged as necessary, they are also considered to be too procedural, 
constraining new ways of thinking, and to detract focus from systems engineering type work. 
Therefore decision making processes slow down, which in turn slows the project progress:  
The process is a bit formalised, most things that are done here are very structured and 
very constrained by procedures. It is how the company has developed. I think years ago 
the company was run by people, now it seems to be run by processes. I think the 
advantage of having these processes is that everybody knows what they should be 
doing and it is not left to individuals, it cuts down the number of Mavericks in the 
business. In the old days, people ran the business and people were allowed to make 
decisions almost on the hoof. Now we have got a lot more checks and gates before we 
can go and do something else. The drawback is that it slows everybody down. It 
sometimes feels like you are just working processes rather than developing a vehicle...I 
remember in the old business...they said too many things are going wrong, so we have 
to do all these checks. We have checks in design reviews, but we are going to have far 
more of this, specific gate reviews. And we would do all that. And I remember thinking, 
wow! the pendulum has swung the other way, and eventually it is very heavily 
constrained, very procedural, much more like civil service, and suddenly everything is 
being clamped down...I thought we would find a happy medium, and I don’t think that 
has happened. 
Despite the awareness and availability of these processes and guidelines some 
processes, which would indicate how certain tasks needed to be done, were not fully developed 
or were not available at the outset. For example, statements of work or technical requirement 
documentation, systems engineering processes were not available at a business level for 
example. This meant that “ility” team members had to develop new processes when required. 
But the development of these new processes was not aligned across the “ilities.” Time spent 
defining and developing these processes detracted from the systems engineering work and in 
some cases this contributed to delays in the programme. The non-alignment of processes 
affected those “ilities” that needed to align their process with the chosen process. 
These issues are compounded by the routines within the MoD. Overcoming the impact 
of change in customer personnel is another challenge for the IPT. The MoD has a policy that 
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personnel on programmes should stay in post 2-3 years, which affects the nature of 
collaborative working. For long-term programmes, this means little continuity and stability from 
the customer, which destabilises the relationship and affects the perception of the quality of the 
relationship, which in turns affects behaviour and the propensity to work collaboratively because 
it  
[M]eans that new relationships have to be developed, and that common understanding is 
no longer there. With the change of face you have different interpretations, it can take a 
new member up to six months to get up to speed, the knowledge, experience and skills 
differ from the previous person and interpretation of written requirements can vary […] it is 
difficult to write a requirement that can only be interpreted in one way.”  
We can see, therefore, how the dynamics of tasks, teams and routines at the process 
level start to shape the level of collaboration that is possible at the governance level, while the 
lack of resources to support collaborative working is a result of the constraints imposed by how 
tendering at the governance level was organized. 
Conclusions 
Through our exploration of the dynamics of the UK defence acquisition, from policy 
initiatives to programme implementation, our preliminary research has shown how the 
institutional level dynamics shape actions at the governance and process level and how these in 
turn can potentially reshape the structure of governance and institutions. The dynamic between 
the institutional and governance level is exemplified in the way in which acquisition policies at 
the institutional level, based on competitive tendering, are being reshaped by changes at the 
governance level as the UK defence sector consolidates. Attempts by the MoD to develop more 
collaborative working relationships with its supply base have been institutionalised in the 
governance mechanism of the Integrated Project Team (IPT). This governance structure 
supports more collaborative approaches but, as we have explained, can be constrained by the 
effects of bidding process—a value for money approach at the governance level. At the 
institutional level, the policy shift from procurement of platforms to acquisition of capability 
influenced the decision for a new IPT structure at the process level. However, the opportunities 
for capability delivery offered by a new structure were only partially realised due to the highly 
resourced constrained team, a legacy of the bidding process.  
At the process level, the dynamics of task and teams were structured around routines; 
the demands on the team to implement corporate routines and the lack of resources all had an 
impact on the effectiveness of task completion. At the same time, human resource routines 
mandating rotation of staff on the client side undermined the collaborative basis of the IPT. The 
dynamics of task, teams and routines at the process level can, therefore, potentially strain or 
enhance the collaborative mindset encapsulated through the IPT at the governance level. As a 
consequence, dynamics at the process level are continually reshaping the collaborative 
approach at the governance level. 
This research contributes to our growing understanding of the UK defence acquisition 
process by using a Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) approach in a 3-tier (institutional, 
governance, process levels) conceptual framework. Through the AMV case, we have attempted 
to explore how these levels interact dynamically through time. In particular, we have shown how 
acquisition policy initiatives at the institutional level can be vitiated by operational routines at the 
process level, and how these routines then shape how the policy initiative is implemented. This 
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paper is merely a first attempt at elaborating these dynamics and a full analysis will be 
forthcoming in due course.  
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